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THE ECONOMICS OF MINED-LAND RECLAMATION
by
David B. Brooks
Chief, Division of Mineral Economics
Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior
Washington, D.C.
A demand for public action in the economic field is usually a
reflection of the fact that, at least for some people, the private
sector is yielding unsatisfactory results. This fairly describes
the current situation as regards environmental protection. Many if
not most people have concluded that private firms acting without
public constraints will produce a higher than acceptable level of
pollution. Unfortunately, whereas the demand for public action is
quite general, the public response must be highly specific; the
Government must decide when, where, and how to act.
The theme of this paper revolves around the need for Governments
to formulate environmental protection plans for both abandoned mine
sites and ongoing mining activity. Therefore, the first thing I
will discuss is why environmental problems almost invariably become
public policy issues. Second, I will discuss how we can make the
needed economic evaluations of suggested policies or programs.
Finally, I want to suggest some things that such evaluations can
tell us about appropriate public actions.
WHY A PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEM ?
In some ways there is little that is new about the economics
of mined-!and reclamation. Every mine affects the land and the rest
of the environment just by breaking the surface, and, conversely, the
character of the land always affects the mining system in some way.
However, if the land problem is old, today's approach to it is
new. Formerly land and the rest of the environment were viewed
simply as obstacles that had tc be overcome on the way to getting
minerals, and the engineer's objective was to minimize the costs of
overcoming them. But today we have come to realize that value is
placed on preserving the non-mineral benefits of the environment. In
other words, the miner now deals with two productive resources--the
minerals and the environment.
The origin of this shift in emphasis is perhaps obvious. On the
one hand, the minerals industry is using increasing amounts of land.
The most dramatic figures relate to surface mining: over the past
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twenty years the proportion of coal recovered from surface mines has
increased from 20 to 35%; the proportion of iron ore, from 75 to 90%;
and the proportion of copper ore from 66 to 80%. ]_/ Deep mining also
makes demands on land use. According to Bureau of Mines estimates,
some 2,000,000 acres (3,125 square miles) have been undermined to such
a degree that they have subsided. Probably moreimportant, about
158,000 of those acres (250 square miles) are in urban areas. And
there are solid wastes as well. Through 1966 around 19 billion tons
of solid waste exclusive of strip mine spoil have been produced by
mining and mineral processing, and this waste covers around 1.8 million
acres.
But others also have a demand for this land. For convenience let
outdoor recreation represent all non-mineral uses of the environment.
Between 1965 and 1966— ha1f the number of years noted above for the
growth of surface mining— visits to National Parks doubled; visits to
National Forests for recreation purposes doubled; and expenditures by
the public for outdoor recreation more than doubled. 2/ If we mentally
add other demands for land to this one, it becomes obvious why the
minerals industry must now treat the environment as productive.
However, these trends do not get to the heart of the matter. All
they show is that there is a conflict, a growing conflict, between
those people who want to use land for mineral extraction and those
who want to use it for another purpose. We must still answer the
real question of why the conflict becomes a public policy issue. After
all, we have hundreds of conflicts over resource use in our system, but
ordinarily we let the private market decide who gets what, and also how
much he must pay for it. In this sense, conflict is only another term
for competition; we leave the decisions to private parties and assume
that their actions, without public intervention, serve the public
interest.
But there are instances where the public does intervene in the
market, and let us examine the rationale behind a few such situations.
In some cases the Government actually prohibits production, as with
opium. In this case production is forbidden because it is believed
that the social costs that attend use of this commodity are much
greater than any private returns that might accrue to the producer.
Another case is the public utility. Public utilities operate in
sectors where it has been found technologically efficient to have a
single producer-one telephone line, one gas pipeline--but having
encouraged the formation of a monopoly, Government has to act as
an overseer to prevent abuses in pricing and service.
What rationale might underlie Government involvement in pollution
problems generally and mined-land reclamation specifically? The
answer is that mining is one of a number of productive activities in
which the very act of production does, or at least can, result in costs
that do not appear in any market transaction or that do not appear in
the correct one, which indicates that the market system is not operating
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as it should.
This is a little abstract so let me approach it by contrasting two
terms: internal cost and external cost. Internal costs are those
that any mine operator must take into account because they appear on
his account books: costs like explosives, fuel, and wages. These
are the costs that the firm attempts to minimize. However, there may
also be external costs, of which pollution is a prominent example.
But consider first a simpler case, blasting. If a mining firm sets
off a blast that breaks someone's window, this firm has imposed a
cost, but one that does not necessarily appear on its account books
and one that it therefore has no incentive to minimize. Fortunately,
legal recourse has been adequate for most problems raised by blasting,
but the court system is not well adapted to deal with pollution where
the sources may be several and the damages diffuse.
A number of authors have documented the external environmental
effects of mining. 3] Consider a strip mine that dumps waste over the
side of a hill into a stream.
In effect, the mine is treating this
water as a free good and therefore lowering its own costs. But this
act may impose higher costs on a farmer downstream when the water
table is raised or fields flooded as a result of sediment-clogged
streams. The public may pay higher costs as culverts are clogged or
road banks eroded. Cities may have to pay higher treatment costs for
their water. All of these are measurable costs that are imposed by
the mining operation.
The point is the following: from the perspective of the whole
economy— not just the single firm-external costs are just as important
as internal costs. Moreover, just as efficiency for the firm requires
private cost minimization, so does efficiency for the economy require
social cost minimization. This means that the economy must be one in
which total costs of production-including direct production costs,
waste disposal costs, and external environmental costs— are minimized. 4/
And here we have the essence of the problem: those with control over
external costs have no incentive to minimize them; those with the
incentive to minimize them have no control over them. 5/
This already suggests some conclusions.
It would appear that
efficiency in the economy could be improved by institutions that will
force external costs to be considered by those who cause them. Also,
the figures indicate that the problem of mined-land reclamation is much
bigger than coal strip mining. It includes all of the effects that
mining imposes on the land surface regardless of the commodity involved
or the type of mining. 6/ And, further, statements to the effect that
mining occupies only a very small part of the land surface are quite
irrelevant when the effects that we are worried about occur downslope,
downstream, or downwind of the mine site.
In short, all mining and mineral processing operations have effects
on the land surface, and some of these effects impose damages. When
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external costs are large and widespread, the free market may yield
results that are far from ideal and this fact provides the rationale
for public action.
THE BENEFIT-COST APPROACH TO PUBLIC DECISION MAKING
So much for generalities about why mined-land becomes a public
policy problem. For our purposes, the important thing is that once
we have recognized a policy issue, we also need a decision model, for
by the very definition of the problem the market system on which we
rely for most decisions is inadequate.
The economist's suggestion for such a model is, in one form or
another, benefit-cost analysis. This approach was originally develop
ed to decide whether government investment projects like dams were
worthwhile, but it can be adapted to great advantage in proposals for
pollution control and environmental protection.
Briefly, benefit-cost analysis is based on the assumption that
there is always a variety of possible courses of public action and
that these alternative courses will vary in effectiveness (i .e ., bene
fits) and cost. Since selection must be made among the proposals, the
goal of the framework is to rank alternatives by evaluating both the
benefits to be gained and the cost entailed by each. (Or, what comes
to the same thing, to compare what would happen with some new policy
or program in effect and what would happen without it.) Furthermore,
inasmuch as the alternatives will vary in their impact on various
groups in society, it is also essential to identify who will receive
the benefits and who will pay the costs.
In the case of mining and mineral processing, there are alternative
ways to effect (1) elimination of adverse environmental effects at
abandoned sites and (2) regulation of existing operations so as to
reduce or eliminate adverse environmental effects. The difficult
part is that all costs and all benefits should be included, and they
must both be valued correctly. As you can well imagine, this is no
easy task. Obviously, we can hardly hope to touch on even the high
points of benefit-cost analysis here. But I can suggest something
about the kinds of information needed to make it work.
Damage Functions and Benefits
The simple fact that wastes are present in the evnironment does
not per se indicate pollution. Rather, as implied above, pollution
occurs only when waste disposal practices— or the lack of them— have
adverse effects on other parties. In order to determine the benefits
that can be obtained from different practices, it is essential to
have some idea of the nature and extent of the damages. As stated
in a recent report:
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"The heart of the waste management problem involves
(1) determining the impact of waste discharges on
quality of the environment, with impact measured
by the time pattern of concentrations of wastes;
and (2) determining the effects of time patterns
of waste concentrations on users of water, air and
land." 7/
Potential benefits can be estimated from damage functions. A
damage function relates the quantity and quality of wastes discharged
to the resulting effects measured as economic costs. For example,
in Figure 1 a given output yields a certain quantity of waste which
in turn causes certain damages depending upon the level of treatment.
Admittedly, this illustration is oversimplified, but it does show
that damage reduction is the objective and that benefits can be
obtained by shifting the damage function (as from the solid to the
dashed line).
In addition, the shape of a damage function can tell us a great
deal about the benefits to be derived from either regulations or re
clamation.
It could indicate that there is a threshold concentration
of some effluent below which no damages are discernable for a given
use (as with point A in Figure 1). For example, suspended sediment
of colloidal size may present no adverse effects in water intended for
agricultural use, though it would be most unpleasant for recreational
use. On the other hand, the damage function could indicate that con
siderable reduction of an effluent is required before economic damages
are appreciably reduced (as between points B and C). This is likely
to be true for acid drainage within the pH range of 3 to 5.
Different population densities and different concentrations of
economic activities are bound to influence the level of damages. For
example, the economic damages resulting from an equal degree of sub
sidence may be negligible in a wooded area but high in an urban one.
In other instances, the damages may be related to variations in stream
hydrology, with greater damages occurring during times of low water
flow.
Finally, an attempt must be made to identify, if not measure,
intangible damages. The most important of these are primarily
aesthetic, such as the difference between a clear mountain stream
and a muddy or rubble-filled one. Fortunately, some procedures have
been developed to deal with such cases that avoid the need for direct
estimation of benefits. The differences among land values for loca
tions with different levels of quality have been used for this purpose.
Among other measures are the extra distance people will drive to
find an unpolluted (or less polluted) recreation area, the added cost
of sound insulation in the home, and the higher medical expenses from
living in certain areas. 8/
One form of damage deserves special mention because it can be
critical in certain regions, viz, the effect of mine effluents, sub-
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sidence, or abandoned mines on economic development. The difficulty
lies in the need, first, to project the course of development with
and without alternative waste disposal policies or reclamation pro
grams and, then, to translate any differences in the rate of economic
growth into benefits attributable to improved management of mining
wastes. Regional income may have to be an explicit goal before such
benefits can be counted.
Cost Functions and Costs
The second half of a benefit-cost analysis involves estimation
of the costs of accomplishing whatever treatment procedure or reclama
tion programis proposed. These are reflected in cost functions, which
show the expense of alternative waste management schemes plotted against
the rate of production.
In planning, cost functions should be evaluated for a wide variety
of alternative techniques. At one extreme may be those that require
only increasing the efficiency of existing processes; at the other
may be possibilities for regional waste management or for relocating
entire communities. Even within a mine or plant, there are alterna
tives that may have very different cost functions. For example, treat
ment of some effluent may be quite expensive per unit treated but
overall control costs reduced by process changes that diminish the
volume of waste generated. 9/ In any case, research can be expected
to cut the costs of waste management as attention is directed to them.
The cost function for each waste management alternative will con
sist of both investment and operating costs computed in terms of the
quantity or quality of waste treated and in terms of the results (that
is, reduced subsidence, less discharge, or whatever). These cost
measurements are likely to show two significant aspects. One is eco
nomies of scale. That is, the cost per unit of waste treatment or of
land reclamation is likely to decrease significantly as the volume of
waste treated or land reclaimed increases. It is this consideration
that suggests the possibility for regional treatment of certain pollut
ants or for regional redevelopment schemes. The other aspect likely to
be shown by the cost information is diminishing returns. In most cases,
the cost of treatment rises very steeply as 100 percent removal of some
particular pollutant is approached. The comparable difficulty with
reclamation may lie with the increase in expenditure as the time allow
ed for reclamation diminishes, or as a greater degree of reclamation
(to the limit of returning the land to its original state) is approached.
This aspect suggests that except for the most virulent kinds of pollution
(which are not likely to occur with mining) a balance should be struck
between the costs of controlling adverse effects and the results (bene
fits), which is the subject of the next section.
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Comparing Alternatives
The data collected on damage functions and cost functions provides
the information needed to determine the most efficient policies and
procedures for dealing with the adverse environmental effects of mining.
Unfortunately, the procedures for comparing benefits and costs are
not simple. A large literature has grown up around the subject, for
many assumptions and qualifications are necessary. They cannot be dealt
with here, but a simple case can be illustrated in Figure 2. The line
sloping downward to the right indicates the marginal (additional)
damages avoided throughout the economic system if wastes are held or
treated to the indicated levels. The marginal costs of this procedure
for all affected parties are represented by the other line. The opti
mum solution for this case is represented by treatment or withholding
of waste to the level indicated by "X". Note that some damages con
tinue (those represented by the area CXD) but that the costs to society
of reducing those damages (the area CXDB) would exeed the damages.
However, the optimum level of control procedure has reduced damages
by an amount represented by the area YOXC at a cost of AOXC.
Actual cases are of course far more complex. There are likely to
be a variety of sources and kinds of waste and many alternatives for
waste management, subsidence control, and the like, each of which has
a different impact on the environment. Further, since the optimum
level of abatement permits some residual damages, it is important to
determine who is suffering from them. The optimum solution on effi
ciency grounds might be politically unacceptable if most of the resi
dual costs are imposed on an already disadvantaged group, or if it
causes an increase in unemployment in a depressed area.
10/ Despite
all of these complications there is every reason to think that optimum
solutions can be developed for various waste management problems. Or,
where non-economic issues are involved, the costs of suboptimum systems
selected for social or political reasons can be measured. 1JJ
PUBLIC POLICY
We can bring these several threads together by suggesting some
conclusions relevant to policy formulation for mined-land reclamation.
The main point of the paper has been that benefit-cost methodology,
while no panacea and despite numerous qualifications, offers the most
useful approach to developing rational public methods for dealing with
the several aspects of mined-land reclamation.
Consider first abandoned mining areas, which are somewhat easier
to deal with than active mines because certain of the qualifications
become irrelevant or even positive factors. For example, not only are
aesthetic benefits obtained but employment opportunities are created.
Nevertheless, given the large number of acres affected in many differ
ent states, one has to ask where money should be spent, and he must
follow this up by asking how much money should be spent in any select-

Downstream, downwind or
Downslope damages ($)

Output per day (tons)
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Figure 1.--Relationships between mine output and

Units of waste withheld from discharge
or treated (tons)

Figure 2.--An optimum level of waste management.
(After Kneese and Bower, op. cit.,
p. 82.)
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ed area. Even casual benefit-cost analysis can suggest answers. To
me it appears that the damages from past mining are so much greater,
and the alternative uses to which mined land could be put so much more
important, that the bulk of any funds should be spent in the urban
and near-urban areas of the East. Part of this reclamation will
simply be designed to eliminate continuing external costs ("basic re
clamation"), but much will require the additional analysis necessary
to justify more expensive special-purpose rehabilitation.
Regulation poses even more difficult problems. Any regulatory system
must be able to deal with three questions. The first is whether the
reservation of some tract for mining, which is commonly a single-purpose
use of land, is justified under the particular circumstances at hand.
This requires a comparison of the net returns from various ways of
using land, and consideration of such possibilities as sequential land
use, hillside zoning, and scenic easements.
Secondly, a regulatory law
must consider what controls will be exercised during the mining process
itself. The objective of the control scheme should be to force firms
to take external effects into account.
Ideally, the stringency of
the control should depend upon expected external damages.
(One possible
technique involves "effluent charges" or taxes based on the quantity
and quality of waste discharged. Their advantage lies in the fact
that the charge can vary with, say, hydrology, so that it is more
expensive to dispose of waste during low-water periods when pollution
levels tend to rise. Effluent charges offer the additional advantage
that they induce private research funds to be devoted to the more
costly stages of the waste management program.) And, third, any
regulatory scheme must consider the plans for closing of mines and
quarries. This is a part of regulation because preplanning for the
eventual use of the land is essential if total costs are to be minimized.
There is no need to go back to the pre-mining conditions, but if the
land is to be mined, it must be possible to return it to a condition
that is both pleasing and productive.
Before closing I should admit that despite my emphasis up to now,
we are not going to be able to wait for optimum solutions before act
ing. There is a clear public demand for both the reduction of pollution
from today's mines and the reclamation of areas scarred from past mining.
It is not so clear what levels of environmental change are tolerable,
but present levels are no longer acceptable.
This suggests two final points. First, we should not be afraid
of formulating approximate or temporary solutions. What we should
avoid are prescriptions that lock the environmental protection plan
into some inefficient institutional or technologic path. Since re
search almost invariably makes waste management less expensive than
first estimated, public action should be flexible enough to permit
private firms to adopt new solutions for environmental problems as
these become available.
And, second, complete benefit-cost analysis is not likely to be
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achieved--or even be necessary--in all circumstances. It has to be ex
pected that some data will be missing and some functions only poorly
known. But neither of these difficulties obviates the need for making
decisions in the present. And, hopefully, the partial analyses we can
make will indicate just those areas in the physical and social sciences
where further research and data collection could do most to improve our
capability for making subsequent decisions.
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COMMENTS
QUESTION: Dr. Brooks, a lot of your discussion tended to be without
specifics. This morning Mr. Cook mentioned figures something
like $17.00 an acre spent on reclamtion in one place and I have seen
figures, from Pennsylvania where over $2000 an acre was spent on reclam
ation. In some places $50 an acre is a high price for the original
land. Would you address yourself to this problem relative to your cost
benefit analysis.
REPLY: In the first place I don't think that basic reclamation to
eliminate many damages is going to cost $1500 to $2000 per acre.
In the mountains where you are trying to restore the surface or where
you are trying to create some special feature I don't know what the
figures would be. In the analysis I am going through which is for a
general condition you shouldn't be spending that much if you can show
that what you are getting out of it is simply not worth $2000 per acre.
There will always be things that may not make sense because we say
there are damages we can not measure. Asthetic effects are hard to
determine and the people who are receiving these damages are either
particularly deserving or have a particular problem.
I think very
largely this is going to be the rational in Appalachia.
In Appalachia
I have great difficulty finding tangible economical damages that I
could point to as streams that are damaged that are very unproductive
and fields that have been destroyed that are very unproductive. The
people are not producing very much in the area and yet I feel a little
uncomfortable going that way with their fear of strange ways. You can
buy quite regularly Appalachian land for $50 an acre and the man you
purchase from ends up with $3000 for his land, probably a very fair price.
He may end up on the public welfare rolls some place elsewhere before he
was a subsisting farmer in Appalachia. Perhaps you are transporting the
basic problem from one place to another. Specifically it is that you
shouldn't be spending $2000 if you can't show $2000 dollars worth of
value. Also'this $2000 may be spent by the company and the return of
this money show up somewhere else in the economy. That is perfectly
legitimate from my point of view.
COMMENT FROM THE FLOOR: I'd like to comment on that figure of $2000
per acre that was mentioned in Pennsylvania. This is an area of a
State Park and which the park people wanted the reclamation done in a
particular manner for park purposes. This is not the cost of the
reclamation of the strip-mined land in Pennsylvania's reclamation work.
We require the operator's to put up a bond of $500 per acre. There have
been some areas where the strip mine operators have had to put up a
larger bond than that in order to guarantee the restoration of the land
to approximate original contour or terrace type contour, but I don't
want to mislead anyone and have people think that it costs $2000 per
acre to reclaim strip-mine land.
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COMMENT FROM THE FLOOR: It seems to me that there is- one thing that
should be considered with regard to the cost to the industry of modi
fying mining methods. To prevent the creation of pollution disorders,
which will last for some time, there is a lesser cost to the industry
at the time that the work is done as opposed to the cost to the public
of having to do it at some later time.
And a second thing I'd like to say with regard to that is that I
think the value of the resource that's being extracted should be con
sidered in terms of the cost that may be required to correct the prob
lem that relates to it. In other words you may expect the total value
of the coal that's extracted to maybe be $1000. This is just an
arbitrary number, but it may cost the public $2000 if they have to re
claim the land from which the mineral was extracted. And I'd like to
ask a question of Dr. Brooks. If it is decided to go into projects
relating to the reclamation of abandoned mine areas, do you have any
comments on the most desirable way of financing this sort of thing,
especially when it may be largely a regional problem?
Dr. Brooks:
I agree with essentially everything you said. My own
opinion is that we ought to divide this pretty clearly into two separate
programs in terms of finances: reclamation of past areas and mining
into, whenever you decide that point, the future. I think reclamation
in the past areas should be a public financing responsibility for the
practical reason that you can't find out who did the mining in a com
munity. Also for the principle that it was the public that got the
benefit of the cheap resources and now the public ought to pay the cost
to get it back. It is a public decision now to go back and fix these
areas up. For the future however what we're really saying is that we
want the full cost of production - the full cost of production meaning
both the production costs as they looked in the past and the environ
mental impact to be treated as normal cost of production - so that as
we go into the future these costs will be imposed upon the mining firm
as part of the price of extracting the material. As a matter of fact,
I think the public would favor legislation to do this. I'd rather
see environmental costs taken out of competition in the same way minimum
wage laws took cutting wages out of the realm of competition back in the
1930's . I think we ought to say that environmental work should be out
of the realm of competition. No one should be able to undercut the
price of coal or gravel or whatever you are producing because they're
not observing their responsibilities for reclamation.
COMMENT FROM THE FLOOR: I would like to make a comment. When you say
that this takes reclamation out of the competition area, I think we can
get back to the price of the product. If there's one place where we
know that the mineral industry is weak, it's in what they get for the
end product. Perhaps work in this area to adjust costs more realistically
in the sale of this end product to the consumer is an area that needs
some work done on it. We have to look at reclamation costs as a new
dimension in mining and adjust the sale price of the product accordingly.

